Pleading—Default Judgment—Amended Petition As Asserting New or Additional “Claim for Relief” by unknown
Washington University Law Review 
Volume 1953 Issue 1 
January 1953 
Pleading—Default Judgment—Amended Petition As Asserting 
New or Additional “Claim for Relief” 
Follow this and additional works at: https://openscholarship.wustl.edu/law_lawreview 
 Part of the Litigation Commons 
Recommended Citation 
Pleading—Default Judgment—Amended Petition As Asserting New or Additional “Claim for Relief”, 1953 
WASH. U. L. Q. 99 (1953). 
Available at: https://openscholarship.wustl.edu/law_lawreview/vol1953/iss1/10 
This Case Comment is brought to you for free and open access by the Law School at Washington University Open 
Scholarship. It has been accepted for inclusion in Washington University Law Review by an authorized 
administrator of Washington University Open Scholarship. For more information, please contact 
digital@wumail.wustl.edu. 
COMMENTS
The question of support for the illegitimate child remains
a pressing problem.30 Though many jurisdictions have not yet
accepted the practically uncontested medical accuracy of the
blood test,3 ' this test has greatly decreased the possibitity of an
incorrect finding of parentage. Thus, states such as Missouri
would be well-advised to require the same assurance of support
for illegitimate children as is provided for legitimate offspring.-2
Therefore it is to be hoped that more states will follow Kansas 33
and Arizona- in taking progressive steps to place the burden
on the proper persons, rather than on the taxpayer or the ille-
gitimate child himself.
PLEADING--DEFAULT JUDGMENT-AMENDED PETITION AS
ASSERTING NEW OR ADDITIONAL "CLAIM FOR RELIEF"
Plaintiff brought an action against two defendants to recover
damages for personal injuries sustained in a fall on a metal
freight door embedded in the sidewalk in front of defendants'
premises. A third defendant was later joined by an amended
petition, and a default judgment for $3,000 was entered against
all three defendants on the amended petition, although the
amended petition (with summons) had only been served on the
last defendant joined. Defendants' motion to set aside the
default judgment was denied, and on appeal directly to the
Missouri Supreme Court, the cause was transferred to the St.
Louis Court of Appeals." Held: affirmed. The new summons
30. In 1946 the United States Public Health Service reported 95,395 ille-
gitimate births in thirty-four states. PLOSCoWD, op. cit. supra note 21, at 101.
31. That the test is accepted by medical authorities, see PLOSCOWE, op. Cit.
supra note 21, at 124. For articles discussing failure of the courts to accept
the tests, see Britt, Blood-Grouping Tests and More "Cultural Lag,"
22 MINN. L. Rnv. 836 (1938); Schatkin, Paternity Blood Grouping Tests:
Recent Setbacks, 32 J. CRIM. L. 458 (1941).
32. Kelly v. Kelly, 329 Mo. 992, 47 S.W.2d 762 (1932); Viertel v. Viertel,
212 Mo. 562, 111 S.W. 579 (1908); Winer v. Schucart, 202 Mo.App. 176,
215 S.W. 905 (1919); Bennett v. Robinson, 180 Mo.App. 56, 165 S.W. 856(1914); Lukowski v. Lukowski, 108 Mo.App. 204, 83 S.W. 274 (1904); of.
Thomas v. Thomas, 238 S.W.2d 454 (Mo. 1951) (father relieved of the duty
of support because the nineteen year old son was earning more than the
father).
33. See note,27 supra.
34. See note 29 supra.
1. Miltenberger v. Center West Enterprise, Inc., 245 S.W.2d 855 (Mo.
1952). The court held that here they had no original, appellate jurisdiction.
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and amended petition need not be served on the original defen-
dants in default, the amended pleadings having asserted no "new
or additional claims for ielief"; the phrase "claim for relief" in
the Missouri Code of Civil Procedure is for all practical pur-
poses identical with the phrase "cause of action" in the old
Missouri code?
Section 5 (a) of the 1945 Missouri Code of Civil Procedure
provides that amended pleadings asserting "new or addi-
tional claims for relief" must be served on parties in default
to an original pleading.3 With but one exception, 4 "claim" or
"claim for relief" was substituted in the new code for "cause
of action," the phrase used in the old code. Thus in this parti-
cular the code was patterned after the federal rules.5 The prin-
cipal problem which the court considers in this case is: how
shall the phrase "claim for relief" be interpreted? Is it the
same as "cause of action" ? If it is the same or so similar as to
be indistinguishable for all practical purposes, then did the
amended petition state a new or additional "cause of action"?
Section 36 of the code provides that in a pleading which sets
forth a claim for relief, the pleader must include a short and
plain statement of "facts" sh9wing that he is entitled to relief.7
2. Miltenberger v. Center West Enterprises, Inc., 251 S.W.2d 385 (Mo.
App. 1952).
3. MO. REV. STAT. § 506.100 (1949):
1. Every pleading subsequent to the original petition . . . shall oe
served upon each of the parties affected thereby, but no service need be
made upon parties in default for failure to appear except that plead-
ings asserting new or additional claims for relief against them shall be
served upon them in the manner provided....
See also Mo. Sup. CT. RULE 3.03 (c).
4. MO. CODE CIV. P. § 23; MO. REV. STAT. § 506.110 (1949): "Suits may be
instituted ... (1) by filing ... a petition setting forth the plaintiff's
cause or causes of action ....
5. For example, compare Mo. CODE CIv. P. §§ 37, 38 39, 42 and 43 with
FED. R. Civ P. §§ 18(a), 18(b), 8(b), 8(e) (2) and 10(L), respectively.
6. There is another issue, with which this comment is not concerned, as
to whether plaintiff followed the proper procedure in joining Carl Fiorito as
a defendant. It is not attempted in this comment to discuss what would
have happened if the court had decided that the two controversial terms
"claim for relief" and "cause of action" were dissimilar, and what interpre-
tation would then have been given to the amended petition to determine
whether it stated a "new or additional claim for relief."
7. MO. BEV. STAT. § 509.050 (1949): "A pleading which sets forth a claim
for relief ...shall contain a short and plain statement of the facts show-
ing that the pleader is entitled to relief. . . ."; Atkinson, Missouri's New
Civil P'ocedure, 9 Mo. L. REV. 47, 62, '73, 76 (1944).
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The federal rules use "claim" where the code uses "facts" above,8
and as a result, the theory of pleading under the two systems
is different; i.e., it is generally conceded that the federal rules
provide for notice pleading, and that the Missouri code provides
for fact pleading.9 Because of this, and because of the close
association between "facts" and "cause of action" established
throughout the history of pleading, it is doubtful that cases con-
struing the federal rules are applicable to our problem.o
Several Missouri cases have touched on the problem, and all
have said either directly or by implication that there is no prac-
tical difference between "claim for relief" and "cause of action."' 0
It is true that in the leading case, Gerber v. Schutte Investment
Co.,' 2 the court apparently was unaware that the phrase "cause
of action" still exists in the code, in section 23. But does that
single appearance of the term in itself require that a distinction
be drawn between the two phrases ?13 Appellant in the princi-
pal case made capital of the point in its briefs and oral argu-
ment, but the court ignored the contention. Because none of
the cases which construed "claim for relief" dealt with section
5 (a) of the code, and because the brief cognizance that has
been given to the phrase is at best strong dicta, the principal
case is one of first impression.
The court concluded that for all practical purposes, "claim
for relief" as used here was the same as "cause of action," and
8. FED. R. Civ. P. 8 (a).
9. Harper, Differences Between Missouri and Federal Procedure, 7 J. OF
Mo. BAR 97 (1951); Pike and Willis, The New Federal Deposition-Dis-
covery Procedure : 1 & II, 38 COL. L. REV. 1179, 1436 (1938).
One could almost pedantically say that the problem is entirely one of
semantics, the requirement for pleading facts being as present in the federal
courts now as it ever was. However, few will disagree that although it is
still necessary to plead facts under the federal rules, it is a different breed
of pleading from the old requirement; there is a real difference in degree.
10. Besides being of doubtful utility, they are also hard to reconcile.
Some cases say that plaintiff must state facts to show that he has a cause
of action, or sufficient to state a cause of action, whereas other cases say
the exact opposite. See generally the annotations on FED. R. CIv. P. 8(a),
in 28 U.S.C.A. (1951).
11. Therrien v. Mercantile Commerce Bank and Trust Co., 360 Mo. 149,
227 S.W.2d 708 (1950); Devault v. Truman, 354 Mo. 1193, 194 S.W.2d 29
(1946); Gerbe; v. Schutte Investment Co., 354 Mo. 1246, 194 S.W.2d 25
12. 354 Mo. 1246, 914 S.W.2d 24 (1946).
13. TRANSCRIPT OF INSTITUTE ON CODE OF CiWL PROCEDURE 19, 20, 22
(1944).
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that the amended petition did not state a new cause of action.',
The court compared the two petitions, 5 and, by applying the
14. Plaintiff had stated a good cause of action (or claim for relief) in
both petitions. See PuossER, TORTs 603 (1941); 1 SHERMAN AND REDFMM,
NEGLIGENCE 64-67; 2 id. at 833, 843, 844; 4 id. at 1834 (Rev. ed. 1941).
15. ". . . that on the 4th day of June, 1949,
PETITION # 1.
as she was walking westwardly
on the sidewalk on the south side of
Market Street,
she was caused to stumble and fall
over the handle of defective and
unsafe metal freight doors,
which were embedded in the concrete
sidewalk and used by the defend-
ants for the purpose of transport-
ing freight in and out of defend-
ants' premises.
[Causation is alleged in the first
petition, but not nearly so
well as in the second.]
That said defect of said doors was
due to defendants in permitting
and maintaining the defective
metal doors as hereinabove men-
tioned in front of the said add-
ress, to-wit: 504 Market Street,
causing a trap to exist;
that said defective and unsafe
metal doors was known to the
defendants
and had continued for a time suffi-
cient and long prior to plaintiff's
injuries for its presence and con-
dition and the danger therefrom
to have been known to said de-
fendants,
[The court says that this allega-
tion is the only change between
the two petitions. Sed quaere.]
PETITION # 2.
plaintiff was walking westwardly
along the sidewalk in front of the
premises of defendants,
when her right foot came into con-
tact with the metal freight or de-
livery door
which was in and forming a part of
the concrete open and public
sidewalk,
and as a direct and proximate result
of the negligence and carelessness
of the defendants as hereinafter
set forth, plaintiff was caused to
fall and sustain serious and per-
manent injuries.
3. PlaintifS further states that all
said defendants were guilty of the
following acts of negligence in
this, to-wit:
(a) That defendants and each and
all of them knew
or by the exercise of ordinary care
could have known
that said metal freight door or de-
livery door was not even with said
sidewalk, that it projected above




tests which had been developed in the past, found that no new
or different amount of damages were sought and no new or
additional injuries claimed, and that, just because there was
a change in or addition to the allegations of the negligence
which caused the injury, that change in itself did not brand
the amended petition as introducing a new or additional cause
of action.16
and by the exercise of reasonable and that as a direct result thereof
care by the defenadants for them said sidewalk in front of the
to have corrected and repaired or premises aforementioned was not
otherwise to have made said metal reasonably safe for the travel of
doors in said place safe, prior the public, more especially plain-
to plaintiff's injuries, tiff,
but that defendants negligently in time thereafter for said defend-
suffered, allowed, permitted and ants and each and all of them to
maintained said metal doors in have remedied or repaired the
said dangerous condition, whereby same.
plaintiff was injured and damaged
as hereinafter set forth." (b) That after defendants and each
and all of them knew or could
have known of the conditions above
referred to in the paragraph let-
tered 'a' they negligently and care-
lessly failed and omitted to warn
plaintiff of said conditions."
Both petitions sought recovery for the same amount of money damages and
the same injuries. They were identical, except for the added defendant and
the differences shown above. (Emphasis and comment added.)
16. The following questions have been developed as test Missouri courts to
determine whether a subsequent petition states a new or different cause of
action than the original petition. If the answer to each is affirmative, then
no new cause of action has been stated. The questions are: Would the same
judgement be rendered on each petition; i.e., would a judgment on one bar
recovery on the other? Can the same plea be entered by defendant? Would
the same measure of damages apply? Is the same injury adhered to? Is
the "gist" of the action the same? Is the identity of the transaction or in-
cident on which the action is based adhered to? Will the same evidence
support both petitions? The pleader, however, has not necessarily' com-
mitted a departure.or a change in his cause of action if: proof of one petition
would not support the other; the quality and quantity of the evidence is not
equal, although the character of the evidence is the same; allegations of new
facts essential to constitute a cause of action and necessitating new evidence
in support of same are introduced; the allegations in the original petition
are general negligence and in the second petition specific negligence; or, the
allegations in the original petition are specific negligence and in the second
petition general negligence. Kirchner v. Grover, 343 Mo. 448, 121 S.W.2d
796 (1938) ; Smith v. Harbinson-Walker Refractories Co., 340 Mo. 389, 100
S.W.2d 909 (1936) ; Bader v. Beck, 173 S.W.2d 647 (Mo. App. 1939) ; Riggs
v. Meeker Co., 8 S.W.2d 1035 (Mo. App. 1928); Ingwerson v. Chicago &
Alton Ry., 150 Mo. App. 374, 130 S.W. 411 (1910); Bick v. Vaughn, 140 Mo.
App. 595, 120 S.W. 618 (1909).
Washington University Open Scholarship
WASHINGTON UNIVERSITY LAW QUARTERLY
It is impossible to obliterate such terms as "facts" or "cause
of action" from the lawyer's vocabulary or the court's opinions.Y
Could it not be truly said that under the federal rules you must
still have a cause, of action to come to court, but you need not
plead it as formerly required. The federal rules abandoned the
old distinctions and requirements as to pleadings which had
developed through the use of these phrases for hundreds of
years in court procedure, and with the substitution of "claim"
and "claim for relief" hoped to rid themselves of these distinc-
tions. Any standard or pleading, however, must be determined
by rules of court which, by their very nature, are incapable of
acute definition.Y, The problems resulting from such a situation
are obvious to one with even a casual acquaintance with the
annotated statute sections on civil procedure.
The code of civil procedure was designed primarily to facili-
tate an expeditious adjudication of each and every case brought
before the court. 9 It must be used and lived with daily by all
practicing attorneys and by the community. A system of pro-
cedure and pleading based on ultra-technical difinitions and
distinctions, which, though perfect in logic, are impossible in
application, is precisely the situation which the code was
designed to replace. It is submitted that, notwithstanding the
mistake in the Schutte case, supra, and the reliance placed upon
this case by later decisions, and notwithstanding the presence of
"cause of action" in section 23 of the code, the opinion of the
court in the principal case is founded upon logic and an under-
standing of the history of our code. Although legal scholars
will continue to develop refined distinctions between a "claim
for relief" and a "cause of action", which are helpful to our
understanding of the problem, the result reached here, upon a
determination that for all practical purposes they are identical,
produced substantial justice. It was in keeping with the spirit
as well as the letter of our modern civil code.
17. Indeed, there was no attempt to remove these from the legal vocabu-
lary. See Sunderland, The New Federal Rules, 45 W. VA. L.Q. 5, 12 (1938).
18. In general, see CLARK, CODE PLEADING 127-148, 392, 462-468, and the
index under "Cause of Action" and "Claim" (1947).
19. Mo. CODE Civ. P. § 2; Mo. REV. STAT. § 506.010 (1949): "It [the Code]
shall be construed to secure the just, speedy, and inexpensive determination
of every action."
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